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Foreword  
by Rupert Graf Strachwitz1 
This is the 3rd and last volume of publications emanating from a conference held 
in Heraklion / Crete in April, 2017.2 It is also the 5th volume of a series of pub-
lications representing the findings of three conferences, held in 2013, 2015, and 
2017 under the heading 
Europe and the Mediterranean  
Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together 
The Maecenata Foundation as the organizer of these conferences wishes to 
thank everybody who helped: 
• the Goelet Foundation, New York,  
• the Lazord Foundation, USA/France/Egypt, 
• the Mercator Foundation, Essen, 
• the Allianz Cultural Foundation, Berlin, 
• the Regional Government of Crete, 
• Villa Vigoni, the German-Italian Centre for European Excellence, Loveno 
di Menaggio, 
• the coorganizers, namely Professor Udo Steinbach of the Governance Center 
Middle East | North Africa of the Humboldt-Viadrina Governance Platform, 
                                                          
1 Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz is the Executive Director of the Maecenata Foundation. 
2 The conference report and two additional papers are published in: Costa Carras, Sarrah Kassem, Udo Stein-
bach: Europe and the Mediterranean – Talking, Learning, Working, and Living Together 3, EBU No. 17, 
Berlin: Maecenata Stiftung 2017, http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/document/52221/ssoar-2017-
Europe_and_the_Mediterranean_Talking.pdf?sequence=3  
Six additionl papers are published in: Polyxeni Adam-Veleni, Murat Çizakça, Vera Costantini, Umut Koldaş, 
Ferdinand Richard, Bernd Thum: Europe and the Mediterranean – Talking, Learning, Working, and Living 
Together 4, EBU No. 18, Berlin: Maecenata Stiftung 2017, http://www.ssoar.info/ssoar/bitstream/handle/doc-
ument/53410/ssoar-2017-Europe_and_the_Mediterranean_Talking.pdf.pdf?sequence=3  
A list of the conference delegates can be found on page 35 of this volume.  
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Dr. Eleftherios Ikonomou of Arts Etc. Intercultural Dialogues, and Pieranto-
nio Rumignani, 
• all presenters, session chairs, and contributors to the publications, and 
• all delegates who made the conferences so inspiring and memorable. 
Over the years, it has become more and more evident that transcultural dia-
logues of this kind are essential to keep bridges open and lines of communica-
tion functioning in very troubled times. What we need to achieve is to prepare 
now for the moment when we can reconstruct the Mediterranean as a common 
memory and living space. We very much hope we can all stay involved in this 
venture together. 
Berlin, in November 2017 
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The Geography of the Mediterranean     
by Eleftherios Ikonomou  
A few days ago, I went to visit the new museum of Eleftherna. The archaeolog-
ical site of this Minoan city was excavated during the last 30 years. An archae-
ologist who had been working at the excavation from the very beginning started 
his presentation by saying:  
“All Minoan cities had an opening towards the sea, the Mediterranean”. He con-
tinued: “This was the location where goods, ideas, myths, and cultures but also 
mercenaries, enemy armies, destruction and death came from.”  
He then went on to unravel the history of the city of Eleftherna. As I listened I 
thought about his presentation in relation to what we had discussed in our con-
ference a few kilometers away, with the growing certainty, that the choice of 
Crete and the city of Heraklion, was a most appropriate choice for our confer-
ence. There, in the modern city-port and Crete’s capital center one could feel 
connected to this long history of the Mediterranean and follow the thread that 
leads from the mythical origins of the dawn of civilisation, as it was named, to 
the contemporary reality. 
We are all in a way familiar with the role of the Mediterranean in our European 
identity and how our cultural heritage begins with the Minoan civilisation, hav-
ing heard of the myths of Daidalos, the Minotaur, Zeus at Mt. Ida and the myth 
of the rape of Europa, as of king Minos’ rule, his powerful thalassocracy, and 
the island’s strong links with the Egyptian, Ancient Near Eastern and Cycladic 
cultures. And then, the end of the Minoan and Cycladic civilizations, with the 
arrival of the Myceneans who came from the north and who, from their strong-
holds, invaded the coastal cities all around the Mediterranean, which marked 
the beginning of the Trojan War, the mythical conquest of the city of Troy, 
described by Homer in his Iliad and his Odyssee, where the very first traveller 
we know, Odysseus the king of Ithaca on his return to his home, travelled not 
only across the Mediterranean, but even to the underworld. 
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The Classical and Hellenistic times brought about further change in the Medi-
terranean. One only needs to think of the city-states of mainland Greece with 
their colonies on the eastern and western shores of the “Big Sea”. Then Alex-
ander the Great of Macedonia emerged. From Pella in Northern Greece Alex-
ander’s empire then extended across the Mediterranean with the founding of 
new cities in northern Africa and the ancient Near East and far beyond, down 
to India. 
With the conquest of Greece by the Romans, the centre of the Mediterranean 
moved to Rome. The eternal city, became the centre of the ancient world. The 
Roman world expanded from the Mediterranean, their Mare Nostrum, to North-
ern England. The Roman army opened new borders, and connected the ancient 
world with roads over land or naval ways. All roads led to Rome, where people 
and goods from the entire empire, gathered. 
The beginnings of Christianity changed the “geography” of the Mediterranean 
yet again. The relocation of the center of the Roman Empire to Constantinople, 
the new Rome, moved the centre of the Mediterranean to the east. Constantino-
ple became the political and religious centre of the Byzantine Empire that ex-
panded all over the Mediterranean world. Here again we find Crete with its early 
Christian Basilicas, a very important Byzantine stronghold. But the real trans-
formation of Crete came with the Venetian conquest. Venice, a naval commer-
cial power, on its quest for more land, occupied Crete and “Candia”, as the city 
was named, became the seat of the Duke. Strong walls surrounded the city and 
its harbour. Through this fortified harbour the products of the island were loaded 
in ships and were transported to Venice, the centre of all commercial routes. 
Two centuries after, when the Ottomans dominated the eastern Mediterranean, 
Northern Africa, the Balkan Peninsula and the Black Sea coasts, Candia the 
easternmost Christian Venetian-ruled stronghold of the western world, falls af-
ter a long siege of 24 years. The city of Candia is now called “Kandiye”. Occu-
pied now by peoples that came from the East, the Ottoman occupation that was 
to last until the end of the 19th century, is still most evident in the cityscape and 
aspects of its life and language today.  
   Europa Bottom-Up Nr. 19 
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The 19th century brought great new changes to the Mediterranean yet again. The 
slow break-up of the Ottoman empire, the industrialization of Northern Europe 
and the continuous colonizations, created new artificial borders that spread the 
power of European states to the Middle East and North Africa. In 1885 Jules 
Francois Camille Ferry declared in a speech on the Colonial Empire, in front of 
the French Chambers of Deputies: “the superior races, have a duty...to civilize 
inferior races”. At the same time the Sykes-Pikot agreement for the Near East 
had divided the areas into regions that looked good in the colonial offices in 
London and Paris, but made no sense on site. 
The effects of colonization were disastrous. The local cultures were dissolved, 
old traditions and ways of life endangered or even destroyed. Countries were 
deprived of their resources, the local populations were diminished as large num-
bers swarmed to the metropolitan centres of Northern Europe, leaving behind 
few who were no longer able to lead their homeland to growth and development. 
The first and second world war which led to disillusionment and disaster, 
brought about new changes. The bankruptsy of European imperialist powers, 
de-colonization after the mid 50s, and the ex-colonies now left back with au-
thoritarian regimes, the rise of socialism, but also of extremism and violence 
compose a new reality.  
In recent years the Democratic Revolution of the Arab World, which is called 
The Arab Spring by the west, fought for the condemnation of corruption, equal 
opportunities, freedom of speech and democratic accountability. Some of these 
slogans are the same ones used by the youth in the crisis regions of Southern 
Europe. These communalities created a different climate in the region. 
The sources of tension and instability in the Mediterranean countries were in-
tensified by the unpresented wave of refugees from the war regions of the Near 
East-Afganistan, Iraq, Syria- and North Africa. Millions of people are on the 
move for various reasons like war, famine, political persecution, ecological and 
climatic problems. Northern Europe is their ultimate goal. But their travel is 
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extremely difficult and organised help is rather seldom. The Mediterranean be-
comes their way towards freedom, but it is also for thousands of them, their 
grave. 
The sources of tension and instability in the region are not based on the belief 
that we are different with diverse cultural identities and religions. Being Chris-
tians or Muslims does not play any role. They both fight for the legitimacy of 
the political systems they live in. 
It is well known that the Mediterranean people have a lot in common: a mutual 
cultural heritage and history, and similar spiritualities. 
Political, social and cultural integration of the Mediterranean peoples will be 
the only way for the democratization. The way to achieve this goal is to work 
together with multiple organizations who believe in the similarities which con-
nect the people around the basin. 
A new narrative based on these issues will create again a democratic and peace-
full Mediterranean.  
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Lessons Learnt 
by Sahar Hamouda   
We began our meeting with a significant remark from Rupert Graf Strachwitz: 
“We the people”, signifying we are humans first. Udo Steinbach’s opening 
speech about the Decameron continued the theme. Storytelling makes us hu-
mans, and I think that after two days of presentations and discussions, one thing 
we agree about is that the common ground we are looking for is, in the end, our 
humanity, along with the universal values that people around the world share. 
But I want to go back to storytelling. History began as storytelling. The first 
voice to blaze out of the darkness of Europe was that of Homer, singing to us of 
the tragedies and suffering brought on by war. How true it still rings today, when 
we witness the horrors and ravages that war is causing around the Mediterra-
nean, and so close to the ancient site of Troy. Storytelling, because it captures 
the essence of “the people” and humanity, is eternal and universal. 
If mobility started with homo sapiens moving out of Africa, it would be epito-
mized in another character out of another story: Odysseus, the traveler par ex-
cellence. Mobility continued when people migrated in search of new territory 
for purposes of livelihood and survival, and freedom of trade and worship. It 
created colonies which, despite their evils, became open spaces. In particular 
the Ottoman empire was a space that encouraged mobility and exchange and 
allowed for the cultural diversity that we laud now. Yes, we heard that Berlin is 
equally diverse today – as are other cities around the globe – but mobility is 
restricted by borders (and sometimes physical walls) and endless paperwork and 
obstructions, and lucky indeed is the person who manages to find refuge or asy-
lum or a job after perhaps surviving the journey across the sea, as Odysseus had 
done. And mobility is not only associated with better opportunities but also with 
displacement and the undesired position of being the “foreigner”. The foreigner 
is accepted depending on his / her utility. In ancient Athens foreigners would be 
welcomed and given the citizenship if they had something to contribute, not on 
account of their naked humanity. Oedipus was welcomed in Thebes because he 
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was the savior who saved it from the Sphinx, but Medea (also referred to by 
Udo Steinbach) was a threat because she was a strong woman. 
“Common ground” was a subject of much discussion. Is there a common 
ground? We explored trade and economy, religion and politics. We discussed 
other things, such as marriage and gastronomy. The Mediterranean is a space of 
exchange, but also of separation. 
The other debate was over crossing bridges and retaining identity, and the sig-
nificance of the nation state. If I can return to “storytelling” and literature again, 
Oedipus was the first man to ask, “Who am I?” Since then we have been trying 
to answer that question. Am I a monolithic being, or multiple, shifting, con-
structed identities? Do I need to be rooted in past and origins, or should I cele-
brate all possibilities of becoming? And I personally, should I limit myself to 
be the “Arab” I am now designated as, or should I rejoice in the memory of my 
genes, care of being Egyptian, African, Greco-Roman, Christian, Arab, Mos-
lem, Mediterranean, with a Turkish grandmother and a Palestinian mother and 
a British education? 
The memory of the modern colonial past has not been dealt with or purged, 
especially as its effects can still be seen. Perhaps it is not our topic, but it is 
something most of us here have in common. It lurks in our subconscious and 
continues to plague our identities and politics. 
Ude also believes, as I passionately do, that culture – film, theater, the novel, 
the performing arts – facilitates the encounter. Of course, it does. It is a universal 
language and it emphasizes our humanity and the common factors we share. But 
it is the privilege of the elite. I know that many organizations are represented 
here who do marvelous work in this area, but how many of the population do 
they reach? How many per cent? In a country of 90 million, like Egypt, with the 
terrible poverty and the eternal struggle of trying to survive another day, how 
many have the luxury to read or go to the theatre or dance performances, or even 
the means to know of them? Yes, some poor people do that, but they are the 
exception. Umut Koldaş pointed out the importance of satisfying every day 
needs. This is something we cannot deny. 
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I would like to quote Udo Steinbach again: “The future of the Mediterranean 
can only be thought of as common – on fair and equal footing”. We are still a 
long way off. A number of you have expressed disappointment with the Barce-
lona Process. Also, in the area of culture, the EU publishes calls for grants as a 
means of exchange between the north and the south. However, it is the Northern 
partners who are generally the lead partners, and we follow. They are the ones 
who have the know-how of writing proposals, the contacts and the lobbying. 
Udo Steinbach also said, “Israel failed to integrate” and perhaps out of political 
correctness we have skirted around the issue. The Israeli / Palestinian conflict 
remains the cause of, or excuse for, the discord and violence in the area. And 
on an emotional and human level, it is the gaping wound in the Arab heart that 
will not heal.  
Another idea that has been repeated is the question of myths, and the distortion 
of history. Some have even said, in private conversations, that myths are lies. 
What about today? Aren’t myths still being fabricated, by politicians and lead-
ers and, more importantly, the media? Are we still not being lied to, all the time? 
Knowledge is power, said Foucault, but those in power hide knowledge from 
us. And by the time we know the truth, it is too late.  
To conclude. We, the Mediterranean, are part of a global economy. Our chal-
lenge is: can we once more re-invent ourselves, or are we only fiddling? 
I turn once more to literature, and to Tennyson’s words on Odysseus: 
“To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.” 
Although I find the Mediterranean present bleak, I am not without hope, because 
we are natural organisms. A seed will keep groping in the dark, until it finds a 
crack, and pushes its way out. So, as we have seen, “the people” are motivated, 
as Nelly Corbel said, and the youth is finding their way around, and they will 
not yield.  
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Culture of Memories: Remember, Explain, Transmit Our Common 
Heritage and Take Actions – Some Introductory Aspects for Our 
Debate 
by Yamina Bettahar   
I will present these questions in 3 main points:  
1. Introduction: Why is this question important for our conference? 
2. Some significant examples: The Mediterranean between myth and reality  
3. To conclude: A few recommendations for the future 
1. Introduction – Why is this question important for our conference? 
Let us remember that The Mediterranean Sea separates Europe from North Af-
rica and the Near East but at the same time it establishes a particular space for 
exchanges. The specificity of this shared space, bound by a mixed history, con-
stitutes a constant challenge for circulations, even circulatory migrations right 
through the Mediterranean Sea. 
Today, it is clearly established that the circulation of the people, the ideas, the 
knowledge, the scientific corpuses, the artistic and esthetic forms around the 
Mediterranean Sea has been – and still is – in the heart of a dynamic real and 
ancient exchanges, which have passed and continue to pass by the various cross-
ing points of the Mediterranean space. 
They lastingly mark the reality and the complexity of the relations between Eu-
rope and their neighbors in the South. For example, it is the case for engineering, 
architecture, painting, literature and quite particularly philosophy (including po-
litical philosophy), fields where the knowledge of the Arab-Islamic world es-
sentially contributed to the development of Europe. 
Naturally, this exchange is not a one-way road. Indeed, on the one hand the 
Arab-Islamic world has a debt to the antique Greco-Roman world and on the 
other hand, the impact of the ideas, the knowledge and the ideologies of Europe 
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on the Arab-Muslim world since the 19th century has been significant and re-
mains so even today. 
The economic, social, political, cultural and scientific interactions between both 
banks of the Mediterranean Sea have formed a dynamic common space. This 
space is not determined by physical conditions: it depends first of all on people’s 
thoughts and actions. 
The ‘Euro-Mediterranean’ space is mainly formed by the density of the relations 
and the mutual interdependences in the past and the present. We shall call it 
“functional” space in the sense that Fernand Braudel understood the “Big Med-
iterranean Sea”. For him, the Big Mediterranean Sea is not only the Mediterra-
nean Sea and its local inhabitants but also Europe until the North of the Alps 
and Africa until the South of the Sahara. 
2. Two significant examples – The Mediterranean between myth and real-
ity 
My first example is about the migration phenomenon: 
The massive arrival of migrants, refugees and asylum seekers on South Euro-
pean coasts is becoming a current phenomenon, notably during last years show-
ing a sharp increase in their number. Simultaneously violence of certain groups, 
claiming allegiance to Islam, propagating terror by awful attacks on the Euro-
pean soil, increased fears and do not allow a reasoned approach of neither the 
presence of Muslims in Europe nor the relations with the Muslim countries. The 
so-called “Cologne affair” in which young German women were believed to be 
harassed by Arab refugees in December 2016 reactivated prejudices based on 
racialist theories or on the so-called “civilizations clash”. As usual, prejudices 
are based on oversight or occultation. To reverse them one must get back to 
facts, notably related to reciprocal cultural contributions and real migrations. 
Close inspection of some of these prejudices may show their meaninglessness 
and moreover, may bring the two sides of Mediterranean Sea culturally to-
gether. 
  
16 
As other regions in the world, Europe was subject of the massive inflow of mi-
grants. The presence of populations coming from the Middle-East area on Eu-
ropean soil during the Neolithic period is now well established.3 These popula-
tions moved there because they were following the Mediterranean Sea coasts or 
feeding rivers like Danube or Rhône rivers. This was due to the agricultural and 
demographic revolution in the Middle-East at that time.  
Without going back to these more distant eras, today’s Europeans forgot even 
the migrations of the nineteenth century. Indeed, consider the sole French case, 
it is interesting to note that in the late nineteenth century, while the Great Re-
cession was striking the country very hard, the French left wing, again faithful 
to the traditions of the pre-war, had a unified and consistent discourse on the 
migration phenomenon. 
In the past the workers from the Mediterranean area (Italians, Spanish, Algeri-
ans, Moroccans, Tunisians…) were chased out of their countries of origin by 
poverty and arrived in France, a country where they knew neither the language 
nor the cultural habits.  
They were sentenced to work under unbelievable conditions and for a pittance!  
Then, after periods of growth in the years 1900-1920, fractures appeared in 
times of crisis.  
Firstly, in the beginning of the 1930s, at a time when unemployment grew, some 
people asked for foreigners to be expelled. 
Afterwards, the recession in France in the 1970s, generated new rejections of 
foreigners which has continued until today. 
In a context where populism is reactivated in certain European countries, the 
effectiveness and even relevance of the French policy are regularly brought into 
question. Surely, the reactivation of populism in France and in Europe has many 
causes. 
                                                          
3 Jean-Paul Demoule, On a retrouvé l’histoire de France. Comment l’archéologie raconte notre passé, Paris, 
Éds. Robert Laffont, 2012. 
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In reality, for years or even decades if not centuries, migration has kept dividing 
and embarrassing European countries and presidential candidates. They also 
failed to find solutions and reach a final settlement, despite the many efforts of 
the international community. These recent years, it has to be said that the treat-
ment of this issue has been abysmal! Added to this are the tensions created by 
ongoing security threats, including acts of terrorism against civilian popula-
tions.  
Germany has experienced the same problems with the Turkish migration. 
Today, the crisis of displaced people (men, women, minor children) has become 
our crisis! A crisis political and moral, as well as demographic. We can recog-
nize here a variant of the Weberian dualism between ethic of responsibility and 
ethic of conviction.4   
And together, Europe and the Mediterranean space, as we are all concerned, we 
should work on finding suitable solutions. 
My second example is about the questions of Islam, democracy and the his-
torical relations between Arabic and European Philosophers: 
In my opinion, a prejudice profoundly rooted in the minds of Europe is that 
Islam would be incompatible with the Republic, the Democracy and the related 
individual’s freedoms which accompanies them. It would be in essence para-
doxical to the Enlightenment.  
It is known that the Islam was very early interpreted in an open manner and not 
very distant way by the spirit of the Lights, even one thousand years before the 
Lights!5   
Recall that the spirit of the Enlightenment was a conquest, long and painful by 
the European peoples.  
                                                          
4 Max Weber, Le Savant et le politique, trad. Par J. Freund, Paris, Plon, 1959. 
5 Jean-Luc Pouthier, Les Religions d’aujourd’hui. Une histoire pour quel avenir?, Paris, Éds. Larousse, 2008; 
Ali Benmakhlouf, Pourquoi lire les philosophes arabes aujourd’hui. L’héritage oublié, Paris, Éds. Albin Mi-
chel, 2015; Ali Abderraziq, L’Islam et les fondements des pouvoirs, Paris, Éditions la Découverte, 2009. 
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Indeed, Churches, after many conflicts, finally adapted themselves to this spirit, 
which freed them from superstitions and from obscurantism. 
As soon as the 8-10 centuries relying on the Koranic text, Arabic philosophers 
developed a central theory according to which the support to Islam without Rea-
son has no relevance. For most of them there is no contradiction between Reli-
gion and Reason, believing in Allah and in Reason at the same time is something 
obvious. 
They have used the “Ancients” thought, as we then called the Greeks of Antiq-
uity, before developing their own concepts.6 
Naturally, as in Christianity, some thinkers and orthodox religious pressure 
groups opposed them a philosophy exclusively centered on crowned texts, here 
the Koran and Tradition, supposed to answer questions asked by the Muslim 
society, in any place, at any time. 
This movement, having become a majority, remained dominant until the begin-
ning of the 20th century. The debate on religion / society in the Muslim countries 
did not however stop and it is confirmed today by new thinkers whose writings 
take up again the Reason philosophers from the 8-10 centuries, in interaction 
with the modernity from Europe. 
It is also remarkable that the Arabic philosophers’ belief that Reason is con-
tained in the religious Law, found a profound echo in the European philosophers 
of the Middle Ages. In the 13th century, the base of the religious faith begins to 
be shaken by heterodox trends in Europe, influenced or even aroused, by the 
Arabic philosophy. 
Thus, the Arabic philosophers would have embodied, along with Aristotle or 
Platon, the philosophic rationality in the Christian West. This Arabic philo-
sophic inheritance became blurred under the influence of time but also because 
of its concealment during the colonial period by thinkers like Ernest Renan! 
                                                          
6 See Ali Benmakhlouf and Jean-Luc Pouthier, Ibidem; Mohammed Arkoun, Ouvertures sur l’Islam, Paris, 
Jacques Grancher, 1992. 
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It is funny to observe that the thesis which Ernest Renan dedicated to Averroës7, 
the most influential Arabic philosopher among his European contemporaries, is 
a remarkable analysis of the echo of the Arabic philosophy in Europe. 
Convinced that Christianity is unsurpassable and that the Arabic philosophy is 
only a pale description of the Greek philosophy, the author describes, over a 
period of four centuries (12-16 century), and in an accurate way the adoption, 
the development then the decline of Averroës’ thoughts in all the European uni-
versities. 
Indeed, as early as the 8-10 centuries and based on the Koran text, Arab philos-
ophers developed a remarkable statement according to which Islam without the 
Reason is not pertinent. For most of them there is no contradiction between the 
religion and the Reason, they belief in both, in Allah and in the Reason. They 
used the thought of the “Ancients”, that the antic Greeks, then developed their 
own concepts. 
Obviously, as for the Christianism, thinkers as well as orthodoxias religious 
pressure groups, opposed a philosophy strictly centered on the holy texts (Koran 
or Hadiths) and believed to respond to the issues posed by the Muslim society, 
every time and everywhere. This religious orientation, which became predomi-
nant, remained controlling up to the 20th century. The debates between Religion 
and Society in Muslim countries never ceased this and nowadays manifested by 
the existence of numerous thinkers the writings of whom reconnect with the 
philosophers from the Reason of the 8-10 centuries, interacting with the moder-
nity stemming from Europe.8 
The conviction of the Arab philosophers that the Reason intimately belongs to 
the religious Law met a deep echo of the European philosophers of the Middle-
                                                          
7 Ernest Renan, Averroès et l’averroïsme, Paris, Durand, (1852), Maisonneuve & Larose, 2002; Ali Benma-
khlouf, Faire de la philosophie arabe aujourd’hui, Le Philosophoire, 2013/2, (n°40), pp. 79-96. 
8 Mohammed Arkoun, Ouvertures sur l’Islam, Paris, Jacques Grancher, 1992; Alain de Libera et Maurice-
Ruben Hayoun, Averroès et averroïsme, Paris, Presses universitaires de France, 1991. 
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Age. In the 13th century, the basics of the religious belief began to be under-
mined by heterodox trends in Europe, influence or even generated by the Arab 
philosophy.    
The Arab philosophers would have embodied the rational philosophy of the 
Christian west, besides Aristotle and Platon. This Arab philosophical legacy 
vanished with time and also due to its occultation during the colonial period by 
thinkers like Ernest Renan in France and others in Europe.  
i) It was the European philosophy during four centuries (12-16) in all European 
universities, without exception.  
ii) Among the emblematic figures or institutions of European averroïsm, we can 
find for example: 
The Sorbonne (averroist bastion if there was one), the philosopher Roger Bacon, 
the Franciscan Alexandre de Halès, the Carmelite Jean Bacon Thorp, Frédéric 
II de Sicile, Dante Alighieri (who in his “Divina Commedia” places Averroës 
in Paradise, next to Saint-Thomas). 
In Raphael’s painting ‘The school of Athens’, the figure of Averroës is repre-
sented alongside the ancient Greek philosophers and their subsequent European 
disciples.9  
The relentless struggle that the catholic church led against Averroës will end 
with a draw: the disappearance of the reference to Arab philosophy in European 
thought forever but also the separation of religion and philosophy.  
Naturally, this reminder has to hide on no account the debt of the Arab Islamic 
world to the antique Greco-Roman world on one hand, and, on the other hand, 
the impact of the ideas, the knowledge and the ideologies of Europe on the Arab 
Muslim world for the 19th century. 
It was significant, and it is even more today. It is the case in particular political 
systems, like the democracy, the personal freedoms, the human rights in Europe, 
                                                          
9 We can see this painting in the “Stanza della Segnatura”, in Musei Vaticani, Città del Vaticano, Roma (Italy). 
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joined nation states governed essentially by republics, but also by constitutional 
monarchies. A similar process seems to work in a number of Muslim countries. 
Indeed, after the decolonization, nation states were born on the European model 
there. Set apart the countries of the Gulf, the majority of the Muslim countries 
adopted the republican system. 
Malaysia, Jordan and Morocco became formally constitutional monarchies. 
The concerned peoples did not need to theorize about the compatibility of the 
Islam with the Republic or the Democracy!  
They asked no Imam if the Republic or the Democracy were allowed or not by 
the Koran. 
They regulated their living together by the adoption of Constitutions by imitat-
ing the European political systems, these systems appearing to them more mod-
ern, more effective than the Caliphate. 
So, the Iranians not only exchanged their monarchy for a republic but, besides, 
considered it as Islamic! 
Thus, the Islam is not concretely incompatible with the Republic and the De-
mocracy. Just think about the Catholicism rejecting the French republic from its 
birth in the 18th century and only accepting it at the end of the Second World 
War!10   
These historical considerations are interesting, but they should not hide the 
question of the current Islamist religious violence, on Islam ground and else-
where!  
As everyone knows, this violence has not always existed and especially is not 
specific to the Islam. 
It is regrettably general in all religions all over the world, including the tropical 
regions where wisdom would have taken refuge, as it is said. For monotheist 
                                                          
10 Jean-Luc Pouthier, op. cit. 
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religions we can quote dozens, even hundreds of verses of the sacred books 
calling for violence of believers against other believers, including against those 
who are sharing the same religion. 
Besides, Islamic violence seems experienced with more intensity by the opin-
ions in Europe compared to those of other regions on the planet. The reason 
could be that the Europeans have been living in peace for more than seventy 
years, contrary to many other peoples, still marked by decolonization wars and 
their dramatic post-independence consequences. 
All of this resulted in the oblivion or sometimes the concealment of wars and 
other violent episodes which marked the history of Europe. Saying this does not 
at all lessen the atrocity of the crimes committed by the Islamist groups. 
The countries of Islam and their societies, yesterday and today, are still badly 
known in Europe, apart from the specialists, who are anyways generally not 
listened to very much. For example, what is the proportion of those who know 
that the fertility rate of Muslim women, Africa set apart, is equal or inferior 
compared to the one of European women and that 70 % of the Muslim popula-
tion is constituted with students! 
Moreover, the economic, scientific and cultural needs of countries bordering the 
South-Mediterranean Sea are huge and numerous international studies under-
line it (UNDP, UNESCO, FAO).  
The human exchanges are also very important, although presently directed at 
from south to north. 
Favoring the populations’ needs as far as possible to the detriment of the purely 
military needs, by associating the lobby groups of the two banks, could establish 
exciting convergent lines. The societies from the South are eager to have ex-
changes, because they are very much aware of how late they are compared to 
Europe. 
This would be a new episode in the long history of exchanges of all kinds around 
the Mediterranean Sea. 
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3. I will finish my presentation, bringing up some elements to feed our de-
bate:  
The countries of Islam and their societies from yesterday and today are poorly 
known in the EU. Apart from the specialists which are generally relatively weak 
and have insufficient political backing as their public opinion is only listened to 
by few.  
Like it had been said before in reality, we know all that the economic, scientific 
and cultural needs of the countries at the South-Mediterranean Sea are immense 
and numerous international studies underline it (UNDP, UNESCO, FAO…). 
While respecting the State authority in the field of education, we must staunchly 
support and facilitate human exchanges, particularly at university, research and 
civil society levels.  
To favor the needs of the populations, as far as possible to the detriment of the 
purely military needs, by associating the civil society of both banks could con-
stitute an exalting axis of convergences. 
The societies of the South apply to the exchanges, because they are very much 
aware of their delay in comparison to Europe. It would be a new episode in the 
long history of the exchanges of all kinds around Mediterranean. 
Finally, in my opinion, its urgent to lift the brakes and cultural boundaries and 
innovate; to create bridges for the sharing of knowledge, to pool and share our 
common heritage and incorporate the contribution of different Mediterranean 
cultures to life in Europe.  
This space is not determined by physical conditions: it depends first of all on 
the thought and actions of men and women. 
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Confronting the Unsaid: Historical Research and the Critical Inter-
pretation of the Present Wars and Crisis in the Middle East and 
North-Africa  
By Nora Lafi   
“Io so tutti questi nomi e so tutti i fatti (attentati alle istituzioni e stragi) di cui 
si sono resi colpevoli. Io so. Ma non ho le prove. Non ho nemmeno indizi. Io so 
perché sono un intellettuale, uno scrittore, che cerca di seguire tutto ciò che 
succede, di conoscere tutto ciò che se ne scrive, di immaginare tutto ciò che non 
si sa o che si tace; che coordina fatti anche lontani, che mette insieme i pezzi 
disorganizzati e frammentari di un intero coerente quadro politico, che ristabi-
lisce la logica là dove sembrano regnare l'arbitrarietà, la follia e il mistero. 
Tutto ciò fa parte del mio mestiere e dell‘istinto del mio mestiere.”11 
Pier Paolo Pasolini (1922-1975), was a poet, film-maker, journalist, philosopher 
and intellectual but he was not a historian. He lived, however, in times in which 
his country was at the centre of complex entanglements of scale between na-
tional politics and cold war geopolitics. This resulted in a destructive season of 
terrorism and political manipulations in Italy. Pasolini denounced the collusion 
between neo-fascist militias, parts of the state apparatus, NATO and the CIA in 
the organisation of deadly terrorist acts in the country.12 His position, as an in-
tellectual, can be a source of inspiration when trying to reflect on how historians 
can tackle the present. Contrary to the periods they study in the archives, and 
for which they reflect on the heuristic status of the historical proof, they don’t 
have such proofs for the present. What they have however, is, in addition to a 
considerable sum of information, the knowledge of some mechanisms, that 
might help interpret the present. This paper is an attempt to interpret current 
events in the Middle East, North Africa, Europe and the Mediterranean in the 
light of this inspiration, around the explicitation of a few facts that are often 
neglected or unsaid. In my case, part of this inspiration also comes directly from 
my work as a historian. 
                                                          
11 Pasolini (Pier Paolo), Io so [I know], Il Corriere della Sera, 14 November 1974. 
12 See: Ganser (Daniele), NATO's Secret Armies. Operation Gladio and terrorism in Western Europe, Abing-
don, Routledge, 2005, 336p and Silj (Alessandro), Malpaese. Criminalità, corruzione e politica nell'Italia della 
Prima Repubblica, Rome, Donzelli, 1994, 483p. 
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While preparing this article indeed, I recalled a scene that happened to me while 
I was in Cairo in 2011 for a research in the national archives of Egypt. I was 
studying the anthropology of urban violence during the French occupation of 
the city between 1797 and the early 1800s13: violence of the repression of pop-
ular revolts, agents provocateurs, sexual violence against women on the squares 
of the city... And suddenly, I saw what I was studying happen again, under a 
new form but with similar logics, under my eyes. I thought my approach as a 
historian was also relevant for understanding the present. Of course, I don’t have 
the same proofs for the present as for the past. In the archives, for this case and 
for others I studied for the 19th and early 20th centuries, I found reports by agents 
provocateurs explaining the success of the intrigues, I found spies (who were 
officially diplomats, geographers, journalists or archaeologists) applying for 
their pension, I saw police officers explaining their strategies. I don’t have ac-
cess to such documents as for the present (but be sure they do exist somewhere). 
This is why historians have to be prudent. They have however a unique under-
standing of some mechanisms. On this basis, here are a few unsaid facts or con-
stantly minimized configurations (geopolitical, ideological) that I think are im-
portant in order to be able to interpret the present with critical eyes and chal-
lenge the ideology that is sometimes hidden beyond false discourses of ration-
ality. Historians of the future will do their work, starting where today’s critical 
interpretations stop due to a lack of access to sources and to the overwhelming 
power of imposed narratives. 
The first of these unsaid aspects, which seem to me of crucial importance due 
to its inertia, relates to the cold war origins of global Jihad. Starting in the mid-
1970s, a form of interpretation of Islam was promoted by the CIA and some of 
its proxies (Saudi and Pakistani intelligence services) in order to challenge the 
geopolitical influence of Soviet Russia in Afghanistan.14 The aim was to pro-
                                                          
13 Lafi (Nora), Mapping and Scaling Urban Violence: The 1800 Insurrection in Cairo, in: Urban Violence in 
the Middle East. Changing Cityscapes in the Transition from Empire to Nation State (eds U. Freitag, N. 
Fuccaro, C. Ghrawi) and N. Lafi, Oxford/New-York, Berghahn, 2015, 334p., p.29-51.  
14 See: Cole (Steve), Ghost Wars. The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan and Bin Laden from the Soviet 
Invasion to September 10, 2001, London, Penguin, 2004, 738p. and Hartman (Andrew), The Red Template: 
US Policy in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan, Third World Quarterly, 2002, 23-3, p.467-489. 
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voke a Russian invasion of the country in defence of the local communist gov-
ernment, and eventually a weakening of Russia's capacity of external domina-
tion. The Soviet invasion happened in 1979 and the alliance between the US, 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and extremist militias lasted at least until the fall of the 
Soviet regime. This not only created a precedent and reinforced extremist ideo-
logies: it also shaped entire networks of power between the US, Saudi Arabia, 
Pakistan and those extremist militias. Members of such militias were later in-
strumental in the creation of Al-Qaeda and part of the networks of power in-
volved in earlier phases remained. In the name of the fight against communism, 
the so-called West played with fire. One cannot forget this aspect when talking 
about Islam, radicalism and civilizational values. 
Another tragic dimension is that the so-called West did not learn from this his-
torical mistake, that counts among the causes of the 2001 tragic attacks in the 
US. The alliance with Jihadist groups and their financing, either directly or 
through proxies, remained an often-used tactic until 2016. In Libya, during the 
late-1970s and the whole 1980s, extremist groups of fighters were used, in ad-
dition to plots aiming at killing M. Qaddafi15, by British and US intelligence 
services in order to destabilize and fight the regime.16 Such tactics are better 
known and documented as for Cuba, but what happened in Libya was compa-
rable.17 This kind of tactic was again applied during the so-called Arab Spring 
of 2010-2011.18 While as a historian I do know how to identity some of the 
agents provocateurs of the past (members of European intelligence services in 
Ottoman cities for example), of course I don't know how to establish the identity 
and exact extent of actions of such figures as for recent events. But their actions 
remind me of those of the past I have seen in the archives. The so-called Arab 
                                                          
15 Lewis (Neil), Memo Mentioned Killing of Qaddafi, The New-York Times, 5 October 1986.  
16 See: Jenkins (Philip), Whose terrorists? Libya and State Criminality, Crime, Law and Social Change, 1988, 
12-1, p.5-24. Also: Lafi (Nora), Kâdhâfi Mu'ammâr al (1942-2011), Encyclopaedia Universalis, 
http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/mu-ammar-al-kadhafi/  
17 See: Hamm (Mark), State-organized homicide: A study of seven CIA plans to assassinate Fidel Castro, 
Making law: The state, the law, and structural contradictions (1993): 315-46. 
18 See : Lafi (Nora), The "Arab Spring" in Global Perspective: Social Movements, Changing Contexts and 
Political Transitions in the Arab World (2010–2014), in S. Berger and H. Nehring (eds.), The History of Social 
Movements in Global Perspective, New-York, Palgrave, 677-702.  
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Spring included, indeed, a strong cold-war-style geopolitical dimension19, with 
the idea, fuelled by NATO experts (possibly under the influence of Polish mem-
bers of this alliance on the model of tactics used in Ukraine) to use these revolts 
against pro-US dictators in Tunisia and Egypt (Ben Ali had been trained at a US 
military intelligence school and was a former CIA correspondent in the coun-
try20) and against pro-Russian dictators in Libya, Syria and Yemen.21 This effort 
at inversing the nature of the revolts is one of the most ambitious (and ambigu-
ous) CIA and NATO operations since 1989. I don’t know all the mechanisms 
and all the people involved, but I recognize some of these mechanisms. What 
my studies in the archives about Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, Egypt, Greece, Leba-
non and Syria in late-Ottoman times have illustrated, is how European powers 
allied with local factions and militias in order to push their own agendas. I sus-
pect it was the case again in 2010 and 2011. This configuration, of course, in-
duced a strong path dependency, of which today’s chaos is a consequence. In-
strumentalization is risky, as once stimulated, a situation can evolve by itself. 
Also, this had already been told by history. In Syria, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and 
Qatar, partly acting as proxies and partly following their own agendas, have 
been supporting various Jihadist groups since 2011.22 The birth of the Syrian 
branch of ISIS was partly a result of covert operations by Turkish intelligence 
services.23 Moreover, many factions of revolts that have been labelled as simply 
“Islamist” are in truth Jihadist. The consequence is that, on the pretext of 
fighting the dictatorship, the country has been destroyed. The Russian interven-
tion in support of the regime had to add itself its share of tragic damages, de-
structions and deaths. It is only in 2016 that Turkey stopped to support Jihadi 
groups in Syria. Saudi Arabia and Qatar, I don’t know. As for the US, France 
and Great-Britain, their commandos on the ground long faced an ambiguous 
                                                          
19 See: Katerina Dalacoura (2012), The 2011 Uprisings in the Middle-East: Political Change and Geopoliti-
cal Implications, International Affairs, 88-1, p.63-79. 
20 Ware (L.B.), Ben Ali's Constitutional Coup in Tunisia, Middle East Journal, 1988, 42-4, p.587-601. 
21 See: Curtis Ryan, The New Arab Cold War and the Struggle for Syria, MERIP, n.262, 2013. 
22 Sanger (David), Rebel Arm Flow is said to benefit Jihadists in Syria, The New-York Times, 14 October 
2012.  
23 See: Philipps (David), Research Paper: ISIS-Turkey Links, HuffPost/Columbia University Institute of Hu-
man Rights, 11/09/2014. 
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situation due to their support to groups whose relationship to the global Jihadist 
ideology was not clear. 
I have more direct and indirect information about Libya. I have been doing my 
PhD about this country, in which I have been living during the period of the 
embargo. I know a lot of people there, both popular and elite, and in all sectors 
of the administration, on all sides and I have direct information on a daily basis. 
What I would like to say is first that after a series of more or less spontaneous 
popular protests against the dictatorship in Bengasi, the real starting point of the 
revolt of 2011 was when factions of armed Jihadist fighters attacked prisons in 
order to free jailed Jihadists and caserns in order to seize more arms.24 From this 
moment on, there was no more peaceful revolt. A media campaign in the “West” 
labelled threats by the regime against these fighters (who had been present in 
the country for decades, often sponsored by foreign powers) as threats against 
the general population. This helped “sell” the idea of a no-fly zone in the “west-
ern” public opinion. This campaign resulted in the ‘vote of resolution 1973’ by 
the security council of the United Nations on 17 March 2011. On 19 March 
2011, in total violation of this resolution25, and betraying Russia and China, who 
had accepted the idea of a no-fly zone but not of an attack against the country, 
the US, Great-Britain and France launched a massive attack that eventually led 
to the fall of the regime after intensive bombings and months on fighting on the 
ground, where US, French and British commandos acted together with Jihadist 
militias. Some of these commandos, probably French, might have participated 
in the killing of M. Qaddafi. The war also made thousands of civilian victims. 
Also, the whole civilian infrastructure of the country was destroyed. Further-
more, it resulted in a double chaos: Jihadists everywhere, eventually turning 
against their former allies. 
Having chosen to openly betray Russia was part of the major mistakes made by 
the NATO in Libya. If there is one thing I am sure of as a historian, it is that 
you do not betray Russia. The consequence of this fact is that Russia decided 
not to ever abandon Syria and to do everything necessary in order to protect the 
                                                          
24 Lafi (Nora), Libye, Encyclopaedia Universalis, http://www.universalis.fr/encyclopedie/libye/  
25 See: Ulfstein (Geir) and Christiansen (Hege), The Legality of the NATO Bombing in Libya, International 
and Comparative Law Quarterly, 2013, 62-1, p.159-171. 
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regime. Now both Libya and Syria have been destroyed. Millions of refugees 
had to leave Syria. In Libya, Europe is now willing to establish a regime that 
controls migrations from Africa and already opened camps for refugees and mi-
grants on a highly questionable basis. The Mediterranean became a sea of death. 
There are also unsaid aspects in the understanding of the question of the refu-
gees from Syria in Europe. One aspect is that many of these refugees are in fact 
Turkish citizens of Kurdish culture who fled the war which their government is 
waging in their region of origin. Labelling them as “Syrians” in Europe was an 
easy compromise in order not to politically confront a difficult ally. 
Another unsaid truth is that a significant number of the victims of the war in 
Syria are Palestinians. They were expelled from their land in 1948 and 1967. 
They have been living in Syria since then, in refugee camps that became urban 
neighbourhoods in Damascus, Aleppo and many other Syrian cities. These 
neighbourhoods have been particularly struck by the war. The war in Syria is 
thus also another episode of the forced displacement of the Palestinian popula-
tion. I know that both as a scholar who as been doing decades of field work in 
Aleppo and Damascus and as a volunteer in a refugee camp in Berlin: I have 
been talking with hundreds of these people. In official discussions about Syria 
however, this dimension is almost never evoked. 
In Yemen, Saudi Arabia is destroying a country, in the name of a geopolitical 
and sectarian opposition to Iran, with the support of Europe and the US. 
The last unsaid aspect I would like to evoke relates to the identity of Europe. 
The question is not only what happens in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 
as “Europe” or “the West” are often used as implicit referents as for civiliza-
tional values. I was in Andalusia this spring. What struck me is how discourses 
inherited from the “Reconquista”, one of the most violent operations of ethnic 
and religious cleaning in history, are still strong today. This is the case for the 
whole identity of Europe, I think. When Nation-States were created, they were 
since the beginning generally unable to handle diversity: one state per each ide-
ologically constructed people, religious uniformity, as the early modern cujus 
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regio ejus religio principle stated, no living together.26 In the Mediterranean and 
Middle East, there was a tradition of living together in diversity, inherited from 
medieval and Ottoman times. Since the 16th century, the very idea of Europe 
has been against it (in the name of principles that we think are universalist): 
“Reconquista”, colonization, creation of post-Ottoman nation states. We have 
to question our own principles and identity in order to discuss the present situ-
ation. It is not “the West” and its principles against a region which would need 
to be taught as for civilizational values. Another cliché indeed in that violence 
is part of the DNA of the region. My 25 years of research in the archives of all 
the countries of the region invites me to challenge this vision. Violence was 
often produced by European powers under the form of colonial occupation and 
of massacres aiming at reinforcing it. The Napoleonic conquest of Egypt was a 
first deadly example. Algeria followed with 130 years of recurrent massacres 
and war crimes.27 The French conquest of Syria between 1918 and 1925 was 
also a history of massacres against the civilian population, with for example the 
massive bombing of civilian neighbourhoods in Damascus.28 Same for the Ital-
ians in Libya.29 This has to be part of our conscience when talking about vio-
lence in the region. Another aspect about violence is that when intercommunal 
violence appeared in the Ottoman Empire, it was often after Europeans had in-
troduced distortions in local balances. This does not mean that I have an irenist 
vision of the Ottoman Empire: it was also a society with violent aspects. But 
this induces me to defy from visions today which are still leaning toward Europe 
giving lessons. The terrible civilizing mission Europe thought it had in the 
world, from the moment of the colonization of Algeria (1830) to the moment of 
the establishment of the mandates of the League of Nations in Syria, Palestine 
and Irak after World War One was a feature so deeply anchored into the very 
nature of Europe that it still shapes foreign policies and political attitudes. There 
                                                          
26 See: Harrington (Joel) and Walser Smith (Helmut), Confessionalization, Community and State-Building in 
Germany (1555-1870), The Journal of Modern History, 1997, 69-1, p.77-101. 
27 Olivier Le Cour Grandmaison, Coloniser. Exterminer: sur la guerre et l'état colonial, Paris 2005. 
28 See: Wright (Quincy), The Bombardment of Damascus, The American Journal of International Law, 1926, 
20-2, p.263-280. Also: Laverty Miller (Joyce), The Syrian Revolt of 1925, International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, 1977, 8-4, p.545-563. 
29 Eric Salerno, Genocidio in Libia, Rome, Il Manifesto, 2005, 150p. 
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are too many political, ideological and historical ambiguities in such postures: 
they have to be critically discussed and abandoned. 
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Culture of Memories   
By Dimitris Stefanakis  
It is often said that the Mediterranean world is nothing but a figment of Homer’s 
imagination in the sense that the great poet defined its narrative dimension 
through the Odyssey. Indeed, Ulysses is considered to be the first cosmopolitan. 
The king of Ithaca sets out on his quest when he gets desperately homesick. At 
the end of his epic adventure he thinks of the Mediterranean as his homeland － 
the same homeland that all of us share up to this day.  
We generally state that past is silence and what makes that silence speak for 
itself is the magical voice of literature. With the help of fiction, we bring back 
to life a considerable part of a long-lost universe. It is amazing how people of 
old times led such fascinating lives, as if the human being constantly invented 
various episodes of a magnificent novel.  
There are two ways of telling stories: either as a historian or as a novelist.  
Both ways implicate the quality of memory that enables a person to recall any 
element of the past. Storytelling is a kind of war that humanity has declared 
against time and therefore degeneration. In that perspective memory ensures a 
bare minimum of immortality.  
We think of History as a stage where kings, fools, murderers and tyrants parade 
in a Shakespearean way. In this grand domain everyday life is of little im-
portance. Historians have the tendency to traverse past time in strides. Historical 
events are the official side of truth. There is nothing to be doubted in these mon-
umental moments of time that we call History.  
In my opinion, though, it is not a question of truth as historians usually claim, 
but rather an attempt of reinvention. In reality we reinvent what took place years 
or even centuries ago. Although it is not quite clear whether memory is a tool 
of storytelling or vice versa, the first has everything to do with time. We narrate 
what we are able to remember not only from personal experience but also from 
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collective memory. In the Alexandrian Quartet by Laurence Durrell, for exam-
ple, the author sheds light on the recent history of Alexandria with the use of 
multiple fictional characters. In doing so he manages to recap a point in time 
known as Mediterranean cosmopolitanism.  
We often treasure memory considering it to be equivalent to accuracy, forget-
ting that memory often becomes as partial as History can be. Literature lies 
somewhere in between them; seeking after its own truth succeeds in bringing 
out a direct experience of everyday life.  
The present is the capital of time and it certainly is a dazzling one with technol-
ogy and all. Although only temporary it is inevitably intertwined with reality. 
On the other hand, the past has a captivating influence on the modern era. Ex-
pelled from the kingdom of time people of the past keep on fascinating us with 
their magnificent creations. It is past time that feedbacks our aesthetic.  
We are mortal: this is time’s deepest meaning in storytelling. Fiction shows us 
the past as well as the present moment in a mortal light; it is an art served by the 
indelibility of memory. If culture is to survive it will survive through that very 
memory used by storytellers. That is why we are used to saying literature is the 
art of remembering. In a way, memory is the only thing that beats time and 
death. Perhaps civilization just signals this triumph.  
German painter and sculptor Anselm Kiefer once said: “I believe above all that 
I wanted to build the palace of my memory, because my memory is my only 
homeland”. It seems that people develop a special bond with time as well as 
place. Artists in particular draw inspiration from past times. In that sense art is 
the genealogy of time, the same way that civilization is of human race.  
After all, what else could memory be than a side effect of time? Both History 
and literature shape this memory, while keeping track of notable moments. In 
the sea of time these moments seem to be small islands inhabited by nostalgia. 
Nonetheless it is not because of nostalgia we are attracted to the past. We are 
right to consider past times as a tank containing vital information for our future. 
We are also right to call this tank human civilization.  
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Language has its own memory. Indeed, we use the word ache after having ex-
perienced pain. In the same way love, which is most poets’ favorite subject, 
traces in memory the most precious feelings. It is generally acknowledged that 
this word game is based on recalling a specific experience. If you try to think of 
a word detached from memory you will probably not succeed. This reminds us 
of Plato who claimed that knowledge is not but reminiscence. Either way we 
are in desperate need of memory so that we may be able to reconstruct the lost 
universe of the past. During this process literature and poetry in particular, 
seems to be a monument of words.  
Perhaps we live in an age when great poetry cannot be written. It is possible to 
argue that today Homer and Virgil would have written in prose, that Shake-
speare would have composed novels. This has to do with the indisputable fact 
that modern prose has become too poetic. One of the pillars of literature, the 
man who has put a full stop to this form of art, author Marcel Proust, gave us 
the perfect example of a prose flavored with poetry. In his autobiographical 
novel in Search of lost time the French novelist follows the narrator’s recollec-
tions of childhood and experiences into adulthood during late 19th century to 
early 20th century aristocratic France. Most specifically he reflects on the loss 
of time while trying to regain the lost moments through memory. Proust abso-
lutely realizes the magic link between memory and time, he laments the passing 
of time, but he takes comfort in the existence of memory. Following his exam-
ple, we should try to regain the lost faces of culture through this magical quality 
thanks to which the human being reinvents so often and so easily his own past.  
Octavio Paz, the great Mexican poet writes: 
“Between what I see and what I say,  
between what I say and what I keep silent, 
between what I keep silent and what I dream,  
between what I dream and what I forget is poetry.” 
Let me paraphrase his verses in order to say: Between what I forget and what I 
remember is literature. 
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John Kelly (Mira Kelly; International Fundraising Consultancy, United King-
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Anna Manice (Co-Founder and President, Lazord Foundation, USA) 
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Ferdinand Richard (President of the Roberto Cimetta Fund, France)  
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Fides Sachs (Project Manager, Maecenata Foundation, Germany)  
Orhan Silier (Historian, Turkey) 
Dimitris Stefanakis (Author, Greece) 
Prof. Dr. Udo Steinbach (Director of the Governance Center Middle East | 
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Dr. Rupert Graf Strachwitz (Executive Director of the Maecenata Foundation, 
Germany) 
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